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Since its inception, the national legal services program has faced seri-
ous political opposition and formidable challenges to fulfilling the prom-
ise of equal access to justice for the nation's poor.1 The 104th Congress
presented legal services programs with their most difficult challenges to
date: reduced federal funding by almost one-third, the largest single-year
funding reduction in the history of the program,2 and sweeping restric-
tions imposed upon the activities of legal services lawyers. With such
dramatic changes as a backdrop, Yale Law School convened the first an-
nual Arthur Liman Colloquium4 to bring together legal services lawyers,
private attorneys, and members of the academy to examine the future of
civil legal services to the poor.
Law schools were appropriately included in this challenge. They were
urged to take concrete steps to respond to the growing unmet legal needs
of the poor by, among other things, adopting mandatory public service
programs in law school,5 expanding clinical programs to offer law stu-
t Practice Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author
is grateful to Matthew McDonald, Lincoln Frakes, and Gabriela Femenia, three excellent law
students, for their valuable assistance.
1. See, e.g., Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Corpora-
tion, 58 A.B.A. J. 930 (1972); Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Inter-
ference, 81 YALE L.J. 231 (1971).
2. While the 104th Congress did not succeed in eliminating all federal funding to the Legal
Services Corporation, federal funding was reduced from $415 million to just $278 million. The
previous largest single year reduction in federal funding occurred between fiscal years 1981 and
1982 when federal funding was reduced by one-fourth.
3. Congress imposed severe restrictions which struck at the core of the independence of
legal services lawyers. Among other things, the restrictions prohibit administrative and legisla-
tive advocacy, challenges to welfare reform legislation and policies, representation of immi-
grants who are not lawful permanent residents, litigation on behalf of prisoners, representation
of public housing residents threatened with eviction based upon alleged drug activity, prohibi-
tion of class action suits and claims for attorney's fees. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (Budget Act of 1996, §
504(a)); see also LSC regulations implementing restrictions, 61 Fed. Reg. 41960 (Aug 13, 1996),
1996 WL 452449, 61 Fed. Reg. 45740 (Aug 29, 1996), 1996 WL 489813.
4. The Colloquium was held March 5-6, 1998, and was co-sponsored by the Yale Law
School Public Service Program and the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization.
5. For example, the University of Pennsylvania Law School requires that all students per-
form 70 hours of public service as a condition of graduation.
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dents experiential learning opportunities while satisfying the legal needs
of impoverished clients, and performing needed research and coordina-
tion functions in the wake of federal defunding of legal services back-up
6centers. Above all, law schools were expected to integrate strong profes-
sional responsibility values into all aspects of the established curriculum,
so that future lawyers would appreciate their unique role in providing ac-
cess to justice for all Americans and in employing the rule of law to rem-
edy pervasive discrimination based upon poverty.
7
In short, the colloquium called upon each of its participant constitu-
encies to join in new and innovative ways to insure that legal services
programs succeed well into the future despite current adversities. The ur-
gency of this message was heightened by the knowledge that a serious
constitutional challenge to the nation's second largest funding source for
civil legal services-the Interest On Lawyer Trust Account program
(IOLTA)s -was briefed and argued, and awaiting decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court.9
As constituent groups shared with each other impressive innovations
from their local communities, there was an opportunity to reflect upon
the many ways that law students enrolled in clinical courses were already
contributing to this mission and how, through increased coordination
with legal services and pro bono communities, these efforts could be
strengthened in the future. Two examples from current clinical initiatives
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School came quickly to mind.
First, clinical faculty should expressly coordinate their case accep-
tance policies with the priorities of legal services programs so that faculty
give greater emphasis to cases that legal services lawyers are prohibited
from handling under current federal restrictions. For example, legal
services lawyers employed in programs that receive federal funding may
6. The Budget Act of 1996 eliminated federal funding to all 16 of the LSC's National Sup-
port Centers, all 50 State Support Units, LSC's five Regional Training Centers, six CALR
Units, and the National Clearinghouse for Legal Services (publisher of the Clearinghouse Re-
view, the poverty law journal for legal services lawyers).
7. Former President Jimmy Carter, in a recent commencement address at the University of
Pennsylvania, stated that "the worst discrimination on earth is rich people against poor people.
This is not a deliberate discrimination. It's not filled with hatred or animosity, but it permeates
the human race." Commencement Address delivered on May 18,1998 in Philadelphia, reprinted
in part, Who are the Rich People?, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 26, 1998, at A13.
8. IOLTA programs generate more than $100 million annually for civil legal services. See
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *11, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foun-
dation, 1998 WL 309070 (U.S. 1998) (No. 96-1578) (Brief available at 1997 WL 476500).
9. On June 15, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held, by a narrow 5-4 margin, that interest
income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the private property of the owner of the
principal. However, the Court expressly took no view on whether IOLTA funds constitute a
taking under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence or whether just compensation is due. These issues
were remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration. See Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998).
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no longer represent public housing tenants facing eviction based upon
alleged drug activity.' ° Without legal services lawyers to help, many fami-
lies will wrongfully lose subsidized housing and be unable to pay for
comparable housing in the private market. The results will be disastrous:
some families will become homeless and be forced to live in shelters or
on the streets; others will split up and assign children to overcrowded
homes of family relatives; still others will move into uninhabitable and
unsafe apartments. Obviously, clinical programs can play a vital role in
safeguarding the rights of tenants who otherwise would receive no legal
help at all.
Clinical programs will also benefit from undertaking these cases.
They are excellent teaching cases for law students because they involve
extensive client and witness interviewing, sophisticated factual investiga-
tion and development of evidence, case planning, negotiation and in-
court representation. Perhaps more importantly, law students must leave
sheltered law school environments to visit public housing projects where
they directly confront the face of poverty, sometimes for the first time,
and learn how a growing underclass of American society struggles for its
daily survival. As the legal process unfolds, clinical supervisors help stu-
dents to wrestle with agency incompetence and maliciousness, opposing
counsel intransigence, and the rigidity and unfairness of a national "one
strike" policy" that purports to justify the eviction of a long-time tenant-
grandmother for the alleged sins of her adult grandson. 2 Students learn
the importance of having a lawyer at one's side in administrative and ju-
dicial systems that are intimidating and unforgiving (and they rightfully
question why Congress has taken away an indigent tenant's lawyer just
when legal help is needed most). Students observe the powerful role that
lawyers play in the drafting of policies and administrative regulations and
in the counseling of governmental clients when vital interests are at stake.
These are powerful lessons not readily learned in the classroom.
10. See Budget Act of 1996, § 504(a)(17); see also LSC Interim Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg.
41965 (August 13, 1996).
11. Notice PIH 96-16 (HA) issued on April 12, 1996, by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development on the subject of "one strike and you're out" screening and eviction
guidelines for public housing authorities. The notice provides guidance for stricter screening
and eviction policies following the President's announcement on March 28, 1996, of a "one
strike and you're out" policy.
12. The "one strike" policy works injustice in many family contexts but perhaps most fre-
quently when mothers and grandmothers, who have lived responsibly in public housing for
many years, face eviction because of the alleged wrongdoing of their adult children or grand-
children. Policies such as these raise important legal and non-legal questions that should be
closely examined with actual experience, not only by future public interest lawyers but also by
future corporate and government lawyers who wield considerable influence over the formation
of public policy.
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In addition to providing representation in restricted cases, law school
clinical programs should also assist legal services programs by identifying
unrestricted cases that pose potential loss of shelter, income, or safety to
indigent clients, but which historically have not received legal help from
the local legal community. In such areas, the rights of the poor are par-
ticularly vulnerable because administrative and judicial proceedings rou-
tinely take place without the scrutiny of lawyers. For example, the clinical
program of the University of Pennsylvania Law School has undertaken
representation in a limited number of civil forfeiture cases in which the
homes of indigent families are at stake. These cases provide law students
(and faculty) with an unobstructed view of how poor people often lose
their most important asset-their homes-without any assistance of
counsel to safeguard their interests against erroneous government intru-
sion. The poor are literally driven onto the streets or into overburdened
city shelters creating higher tax burdens on the general community, while
the proceeds from the forced sale of their homes go to enrich law en-
forcement agencies.
These cases allow students to witness the harsh consequences of puni-
tive forfeiture statutes that permit the exercise of enormous police power
but which fail to provide adequate safeguards against wrongful govern-
mental action. Without legal representation, the scales of justice are
grossly unbalanced, providing students with an experience that dramati-
cally contrasts with their classroom study of appellate cases in which all
litigants appear to be represented by experienced counsel who skillfully
argue the finer points of law to their clients' advantage. There is simply
no hiding the fact that the adversarial system doesn't work as it should
when disadvantaged and unsophisticated individuals are forced to stand
alone in defending their property against superior governmental re-
sources. Once this genie is out of the bottle, it can never go back in. The
hope is that the experience transforms students into enthusiastic advo-
cates for a just legal system that serves the needs of the powerless as well
as the powerful.
Clinical involvement in cases such as these also permits law schools to
fulfill their historic role of identifying and writing about needed legal re-
form. While limited in number, the experiences gained from representing
indigent homeowners in state civil forfeiture proceedings and observing
others who proceed without counsel demonstrate that overall forfeiture
reform is seriously overdue. The balance of this Paper calls for three spe-
cific changes in the civil forfeiture system intended to achieve measurable
progress in balancing the important interests at stake in these proceed-
ings: court-appointed counsel for indigent property owners; detailed,
public accounting of all assets forfeited annually to law enforcement
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authorities; and redirection of not less than fifty percent of forfeited asset
funds from law enforcement agencies to the creation of special services
districts in high poverty communities, so that drug prevention and com-
munity empowerment services, including free civil legal services to the
poor, can be purchased for community benefit.
Civil asset forfeiture is based on the legal fiction that property-
homes, vessels, cars and even cash-can be found guilty of wrongdoing
and thereby be subject to forfeiture to the government. 13 While there are
many federal forfeiture statutes," civil forfeiture became a weapon in the
war against drugs with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970." As amended, the Act provided for
16the forfeiture of controlled substances and conveyances used to trans-
port controlled substancesY, moneys and negotiable instruments," and
real property9 used to facilitate violations. Civil asset forfeitures in-
creased enormously when Congress revised the federal drug forfeiture
program to create this "surgical strike" weapon in the war on drugs. ° The
purpose of this change was to strike a fatal blow at drug traffickers by
taking away their cars, boats, airplanes, homes, and cash, while simulta-
neously increasing the resources of the seizing agency. Once seized and
forfeited, the property may be destroyed, retained for official use by law
enforcement agencies participating in the seizure and forfeiture, or sold.
Proceeds from the sale of forfeited assets were formerly deposited in the
general fund of the U.S. Treasury but now flow primarily to the Depart-
ment of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Fund21 and the Department of the
Treasury's Forfeiture Fund" to be used for law enforcement purposes.2z
As of June 30, 1990, the seized asset inventories of the two programs
were valued at $1.167 billion and $389 million, respectively, totaling
$1.556 billion in assets. After deducting for expenses estimated to be
$55.4 million, the two programs netted a huge surplus. In fiscal year 1991
alone, the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund reported income
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-358, Part 1, at 20 (summarizing antecedents of civil asset forfei-
ture as background materials for report on Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1965).
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2344 (cigarettes), 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (gamecocks), 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(RICO violation property).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1978).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1984).
20. See, e.g., Michele M. Jochner, From Fiction to Fact: The Supreme Court's Re-Evaluation
of Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, 82 ILL. B.J. 560 (1994).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4).
22. 31 U.S.C. § 9703.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1).
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of $658 million and expenses of $118 million, netting a surplus of $464
million.24
State and local law enforcement agencies can receive a portion of for-
feited assets in return for cooperating with the Department of Justice and
Customs Service in seizure and forfeiture cases. The amounts of shared
funds have also increased significantly and state and local law enforce-
ment authorities have increasingly relied upon shared assets for their
budgetary operations.2 In addition, individual states have adopted their
own civil forfeiture laws modeled upon the Uniform Controlled Sub-
stances Act.26 For example, in 1988 Pennsylvania enacted legislation 7
providing for the loss of property rights to the Commonwealth for viola-
tions of the state Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act2 The state law directs that the district attorney and the state attor-
ney general utilize forfeited property or proceeds therefrom for the pur-
pose of enforcing the provisions of the same Act.29
In recent years, the civil asset forfeiture program has attracted grow-
ing criticism. Since the program is civil in nature, it does not contain the
constitutional safeguards mandated in criminal cases and it places prop-
erty owners at risk for loss of their property without ever being convicted
or even charged with a crime.0 As a result, commentators have charged
that the use of forfeiture has become too widespread and that the war on
drugs has become a "war on the Constitution."'"
The public is also genuinely concerned that the government's strong
pecuniary interest in civil forfeiture creates a potential conflict of interest
that threatens to distort valid police goals, thereby encouraging law en-
forcement officers to maximize revenue at the expense of crime preven-
tion.' A former Department of Justice Chief responsible for the AssetForfeiture Section stated that the department's "marching orders" were:
24. See Alison Roberts Solomon, Drugs and Money: How Successful Is the Seizure and For-
feiture Program at Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 EMORY L.J. 1149, 1167
(1993).
25. See id. at 1174.
26. See Solomon, supra note 24, at 1180.
27. Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act, 42 PA. C.S.A. § 6801-6802.
28. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, 35 P.S. § 780-101 etseq.
29. 42 PA. C.S.A. §6801(e)-(h).
30. For example, a 1993 study in Arizona found that three-fourths of those who lost prop-
erty in Arizona police seizures were never accused of any wrongdoing, and more than $4 mil-
lion in cash was seized from people never charged with a crime. Eric Miller, DPS to Close For-
feiture Unit, Director Notes Potential Conflicts, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 13, 1997, at B1.
31. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 24, at 1150.
32. See Erik Grant Luna, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis Court's Constitutional
House Of Cards, 49 STAN. L. REV. 409,432 (1997); see also Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Po-
licing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 56-84
(1998).
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"Forfeit, forfeit, forfeit. Get money, get money, get money."33 A 1990
memo from the Attorney General admonished U.S. Attorneys to in-
crease the volume of forfeitures in order to meet the Department of Jus-
tice's annual budget target. 4
In addition, there is deep concern that current forfeiture law vests un-
fettered discretion over the expenditure of large sums of public moneys
in the hands of unelected officials,35 and permits expenditures unrelated
to law enforcement objectives without appropriate public accountabil-
ity. 6 Cynicism and public distrust have been heightened by highly publi-
cized instances of abuse.37
These legitimate concerns signal that the drug asset forfeiture pro-
gram, while well-intended and undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the
war on drugs, is in dire need of legislative reform at all levels!'
I. COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
Forfeiture actions filed under the Pennsylvania Controlled Substances
Forfeiture Act39 are civil cases,40 but in practice they closely resemble
criminal proceedings. The cases are brought in the name of the Com-
33. Luna, supra note 32, at 433 n.198.
34. Id. at 433, n.199; see also United States v. James David Good Real Property, 510 U.S.
43, 56, n.2 (1993) (quoting Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 38 United States At-
torney's Bulletin 180 (DOJ 1990)).
35. See Eddie Olsen, N.J. Prosecutor Seizes on Forfeitures, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 18,
1998, at Al (quoting a State Senator who contends that county government-and not a prosecu-
tor appointed by the governor-should decide how hundreds of thousands of public dollars are
spent).
36. Among the questioned uses of increased forfeiture funds by the County Prosecutor
were the purchases of two $11,000 backdrops used for the County Prosecutor's news confer-
ences. See id.
37. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-358, Part 1, at 23-27 (stories of Willie Jones and Billy
Munnerlyn, two witnesses at Judiciary Committee hearings); see also Michael Isikoff, Drug
Raids Net Much Valuable Property-And Legal Uproar, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1991, at Al
(reporting the federal seizure of three fraternity houses at the University of Virginia with esti-
mated value of $1 million for the confiscation of several hundred dollars worth of drugs); Luna,
supra note 32, at 432 n.194 (noting that law enforcement personnel use seized televisions and
stereos in their offices) and at 433 n.195 (noting that the district attorney in Suffolk County,
New York, drives a seized BMW 735i); Solomon, supra note 24, at 1171 n.133 (describing a
GAO audit that discovered that a DEA field office had converted curio cabinets and Norman
Rockwell figurines for official use) and at 1171 n.138 (noting that in some cases the DEA placed
items into official use without ever processing the forfeited items); Platte, Duffy Diverted U.S.
Dng-Seizure Funds to Secret Account Sheriff, L.A. TIMES, November 1, 1990 (reporting that
drug seizure funds of more than $300,000 were not deposited in the county treasury and, ac-
cording to news accounts, were diverted to a secret sheriff's account).
38. In an excellent article on the subject of civil forfeiture, authors Blumenson and Nilsen
conclude that while the massive outpourings of money and effort have produced record num-
bers of drug seizures, asset forfeitures and prosecutions, by more meaningful measures the drug
war has been an extraordinary failure. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 32, at 37.
39. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6801-02 (West 1997).
40. See Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 (Pa. 1997).
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monwealth of Pennsylvania4 and are prosecuted by the local district at-
torney's office.4 2 In Philadelphia, forfeiture hearings are held in the
Criminal Justice Center, a newly constructed high-rise courthouse, spe-
cially designed to efficiently process the large number of criminal cases
arising each year in a major urban center. All individuals entering the
building are electronically searched for weapons before entering a bank
of elevators which deliver them to courtrooms on upper floors. The ele-
vators open to crowded hallways where prosecutors, defense lawyers and
uniformed police officers scurry to find the courtrooms in which their
cases will be called.
Forfeiture cases are assigned to Courtroom 501. Once inside the
courtroom, cases are called from a list. They are prosecuted by the same
assistant district attorney and tried by the same assigned judge, subject
only to infrequent rotation. Scores of indigent citizens, disproportionately
people of color, sit on benches toward the back of the courtroom waiting
for their names (or descriptions of their properties) to be called aloud by
the clerk of the court. The prosecutor and court staff do most of the
talking, pausing frequently to inquire about the presence of police offi-
cers expected to testify in cases appearing on the court list. Most of the
time, however, cases are simply continued to new trial dates months into
the future. In the interim, private property seized by law enforcement
agencies remains within the exclusive custody and control of the district
attorney's office.
It is clear that forfeiture cases enjoy the full resources and power of
the state. Unlike civil courtrooms in which the presiding judge exercises
dominant control, forfeiture court appears to revolve around the actions
of the prosecutor. Cases proceed or await new hearing dates seemingly at
the wish of the prosecutor. Property owners confused by the court's pro-
cedures direct their inquiries to her. Except for an occasional contested
hearing, the judge's role appears limited to approving rescheduled hear-
ing dates that have been mutually agreed upon by the prosecutor and the
scheduling clerk. Without knowing more, a casual observer would almost
certainly identify forfeiture court as a criminal courtroom. It is a confus-
ing and intimidating place.
On closer observation, however, the civil nature of the courtroom be-
comes more evident. There are no public defenders present and only oc-
casionally does a private defense lawyer enter the courtroom. Indigent
parties are alone, confused by the process and unsure of what is expected
of them. They passively wait for long periods of time while retaining
41. See 42 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6802(a) (West 1997).
42. See 42PA.CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6802(b) (West 1997).
Vol. 17:507, 1998
Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform
hope that they will regain their property once they tell their stories to the
judge.
Indigent property owners come to forfeiture court without an attor-
ney for many reasons. Some do not know that they may seek legal assis-
tance or even that a lawyer might be helpful to them in such a proceed-
ing. Unlike other civil actions commenced with a formal complaint and a
notice to defend43 that informs defendants in English and Spanish where
they can go to obtain legal help, forfeiture proceedings are begun by a
petition 44 and an abbreviated notice which states simply that a default
judgment may be entered if a timely response is not filed.4 ' The district
attorney's office does not attach voluntarily the more detailed notice to
defend.
In any event, indigent property owners lack the ability to pay a lawyer
and are therefore dependent entirely upon the availability of free legal
assistance in the local community. However, the public defender's office
will not represent them because these are not criminal proceedings, and
the local legal services program, already seriously under-funded and fac-
ing exploding client demand, cannot staff forfeiture cases even if they fall
within the program's ever-narrowing case acceptance priorities. The pri-
vate bar's pro bono program would like to help, but also is overtaxed
with referrals for family law and child disability cases.
The truth is that civil forfeiture cases fall between the cracks of the
public defender and legal services delivery systems. Indigent homeown-
ers must fend for themselves, too often with disastrous results. It is not
difficult to understand why.
Many low-income homeowners who come to forfeiture court are liv-
ing on the street or in homeless shelters because their homes have al-
ready been seized by law enforcement authorities without advance notice
or an opportunity to make alternative living plans. Merely surviving in
such a hostile environment consumes the homeowner's time and ener-
gies. This leaves them little capacity, time, or money to prepare and file
responsive pleadings or to develop factual evidence in support of their
claims. It is unreasonable to believe that clients can mount a credible de-
fense under such adverse conditions.
The civil practice clinic at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
accepted its first drug-related civil forfeiture case when a single mother
43. See Pa. R.C.P. 1018.1.
44. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6802(a) (West 1997).
45. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6802(b) (requiring that the notice state the following:
"You are required to file an answer to this petition, setting forth your title in, and right to pos-
session of, said property within 30 days from the service hereof, and you are also notified that, if
you fail to file said answer, a defense of forfeiture and condemnation will be entered against
said property.").
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was thrust into the city's homeless shelter after her home was seized and
the district attorney's office filed a petition seeking forfeiture of the
house. The referral for help highlighted the need for access to counsel in
such important matters. The Commonwealth Court, Pennsylvania's in-
termediate appellate court, had previously ruled in a case of first impres-
sion that an indigent property owner was entitled to counsel in civil for-
feiture cases under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
46Amendment. While acknowledging that the due process clause histori-
cally required appointments of counsel only in cases threatening the
physical liberty of criminal defendants47 the Commonwealth Court inter-
preted the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lassiter v. Department of So-
cial Services4' simply to create a presumption against appointment of
counsel where liberty interests were not involved. In the Court's opinion,
due process protections might still require the appointment of counsel in
appropriate cases when applying the factors enumerated by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.49
While Pennsylvania courts require that an indigent parent be in-
formed of the right to free counsel in involuntary parental rights cases"
and certain paternity actions,51 the Commonwealth Court noted that no
Pennsylvania appellate court, and only one non-Pennsylvania court, had
answered the precise question of whether an indigent property owner
was constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in civil forfeiture
actions. In a case known as United States v. 1604 Oceola, a district court
in Texas concluded that because there was little likelihood of an errone-
ous deprivation of property, court-appointed counsel was not required
where a property owner pled guilty to drug charges stemming from
transactions involving the home. However, the Oceola court expressly
limited its holding to the facts of that case, going to great pains to note in
dicta that the interests of a homeowner in maintaining a family home
upon which the mortgage had been paid for many years was substantial,
and that the government's interest was less compelling where the home
was not a present danger to society. The Court viewed the forfeiture as
an attempt by government to exact an additional penalty upon the
46. See Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d 736 (Pa. Comuw. Ct. 1994).
47. See id. at 742.
48. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
49. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
50. See In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1973).
51. See Corra v. Coil, 451 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
52. See United States v. 1604 Oceola, 803 F.Supp 1194 (N.D. Tex 1992) (hereinafter
Oceola).
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homeowner"3 for which the additional burden of appointing counsel
would not be overwhelming. The Oceola court continued:
Perhaps the most substantial imposition upon the government would be re-
quiring the Plaintiff to oppose an attorney in a complicated and abstruse field
where the Plaintiff normally expects to meet only pro-se litigants struggling
through the claimant process.
After the Oceola decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Austin v.
U.S.5 that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment was ap-
plicable to civil forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth Court rea-
soned that the Austin holding would require a different result in Oceola
because of the homeowner's increased likelihood of suffering an errone-
ous deprivation of property. Therefore, based largely upon the Austin
holding, the Commonwealth Court concluded that court-appointed coun-
sel for indigent property owners was constitutionally required. 6
On the strength of the Commonwealth Court's ruling, the clinic filed
a motion requesting that counsel be appointed to represent the client.
The hope was that a favorable ruling at the trial level would have the
practical effect not only of insuring counsel in this case but also of leading
to routine court appointments in all of the pro se forfeiture cases awaiting
adjudication. Unfortunately, the forfeiture judge decided not to grant any
such motions until the State Supreme Court completed its review of the
Commonwealth Court's decision.
The landmark decision of the Commonwealth Court was short-lived.
In 1997, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth
Court and expressly adopted the Lassiter presumption that an appoint-
ment of counsel is not constitutionally required in civil cases that do not
implicate a liberty interesti 7 When applying the Mathews v. Eldridge fac-
tors, the State Supreme Court found that the property interest at stake
commanded a lesser level of due process protection, while the govern-
ment's interest in deterring illegal drug activity by confiscating the profits
therefrom was significant. The Court also found the risk of erroneous
deprivation to be minimal and the burden to government of providing
counsel to an entire class of claimants to be substantial."8 As a result, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
53. See Oceola, 803 F. Supp. at 1197.
54. Id.
55. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
56. See Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d 736, 744-47 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994).
57. See Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 704 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1997). The case did
not raise the question of whether the governmental seizure of a family home without advance
notice or opportunity for the family to make alternative living plans, thereby subjecting the
family to homelessness, implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
58. See id. at 616.
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Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel to
indigent claimants in forfeiture cases.59 Courts in at least eight other
states have agreed that court-appointed counsel is not constitutionally
required.60
While court-appointed counsel appears not to be constitutionally re-
quired in civil forfeiture proceedings, it is clear that Congress and state
legislatures may afford property owners greater protection than what the
constitution requires. Indigent homeowners in particular have substantial
interests at stake and do face a high likelihood of erroneous deprivation
for the reasons previously discussed. In many such cases, homeowners
may never be convicted of any offense and some may not even be
charged with any wrongdoing. But, without counsel, they are likely to
forfeit their property in uncontested actions or in hastily prepared con-
tested actions where their pro se defenses offer little real hope of success
against superior governmental resources.6'
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,62 sponsored by Representa-
tive Henry J. Hyde 3 and introduced in the House of Representatives on
June 19, 1997, proposes important procedural reforms for federal forfei-
ture actions, including the appointment of counsel for indigent parties in
appropriate cases." The proposed Act provides as follows:
(d) APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. - (1) If the person filing a claim is finan-
cially unable to obtain representation by counsel and requests that counsel
be appointed, the court may appoint counsel to represent that person with
respect to the claim. In determining whether to appoint counsel to represent
the person filing the claim, the court shall take into account-
(A) the nature and value of the property subject to forfeiture, including the
hardship to the claimant from the loss of the property seized, compared to
the expense of appointing counsel;
59. The Court did not reach the issue of whether court-appointed counsel is mandated by
the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 617.
60. See, e.g., Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) (declining to establish a right to
counsel but granting courts discretion to appoint counsel in forfeiture proceedings conducted
prior to criminal proceedings so that the property owner's right against self-incrimination can be
protected); People v. $30,000 United States Currency, 35 Cal. App. 4th 936 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995); State v. Tuipuapua, 925 P.2d 311 (Haw. 1996); State v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 889 P.2d
109 (Idaho 1995); In re Bly, 456 N.W. 2d 195 (Iowa 1990); State v. Predka, 555 N.W. 2d 202
(Iowa 1996); Vergari v. Lockhart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Morgenthau v. Gar-
cia, 148 Misc. 2d 900, 561 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); State ex rel Eikenberry v. Frod-
ert, 924 P.2d 933 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
61. It has been suggested that the absence of counsel is one of the primary reasons why at
least 80% of civil forfeiture cases are not challenged. See H.R. REP, No. 105-358, at 28-29
(1997).
62. H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. (1997).
63. U.S. House of Representatives, Illinois (6th District). Representative Hyde is Chair of
the House Committee on the Judiciary.
64. See H.R. 1965, § 2(d) (Appointment of Counsel).
Vol. 17:507, 1998
Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform
(B) the claimant's standing to contest the forfeiture; and
(C) whether the claim appears to be made in good faith or to be frivolous.
While this provision would not make court appointments of counsel
automatic, it would take a major step toward insuring that counsel is ap-
pointed in appropriate cases. Unfortunately, this proposed reform (and
previous similar versions) has been pending for some time in Congress.6
Unquestionably, the Department of Justice has undermined this reform
effort by opposing court-appointments in federal forfeiture proceedings.
6
While the government's interests never go unrepresented in forfeiture
proceedings, the Department apparently believes that a property owner's
interests are adequately protected by the individual's potential ability to
recover legal expenses in a successful action against the United States
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).6
The Department's argument is plainly unconvincing. Only court-
appointed counsel will assure that indigent property owners have the
help of a lawyer in all appropriate civil forfeiture cases and, most impor-
tantly, from the earliest stages of the proceedings. In contrast, EAJA fees
will at best serve as a very limited financial inducement for some private
attorneys to get involved in selected cases, but only if an indigent prop-
erty owner is able to engage in a search for a lawyer and then is able to
convince the lawyer to take on protracted litigation for contingent remu-
neration under a forfeiture statute that is strongly weighted in favor of
the government. Even if a lawyer takes a case and wins it, EAJA fees still
are not guaranteed. Instead, the government is likely to oppose a motion
for EAJA fees on the basis that the government's action was substan-
tially justified under the statutef. Collateral litigation challenging the
lawyer's entitlement to EAJA fees and opposing the amount of compen-
sable hours will almost certainly discourage private counsel from repre-
senting indigent parties. If the availability of EAJA fees is an acceptable
answer, why do so many property owners go unrepresented?
65. H.R. 1965 (introduced on June 19, 1997 and co-sponsored by only 3 representatives) is
the most recent version of the proposed Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act proposed by Repre-
sentative Hyde. Prior versions include H.R. 1835, 105th Cong., introduced on June 10, 1997 with
29 cosponsors; H.R. 1916, 104th Cong., introduced on June 22, 1995 with 23 cosponsors; and
H.R. 2417, 103rd Cong., introduced on June 15, 1993 with 62 cosponsors. See also H.R. 3347,
103rd Cong. (Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, introduced by Representative Conyers on October
22, 1993).
66. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the Committee on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 111, 120 (1997).
67. See id.; see also Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 229 (1996).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584 (11th Cir. 1995); Creative Electric v.
United States, 1997 WL 151779 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
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Moreover, in state forfeiture proceedings where the United States is
not a party, federal EAJA fees obviously are not available to indigent
property owners. Only court-appointed counsel in state proceedings offer
indigent property owners any meaningful chance of safeguarding vital in-
terests.
The cost of providing court-appointed counsel can easily be paid from
funds deposited in the federal or state forfeiture asset fund (whichever is
appropriate) without imposing any additional burden on taxpayers. To
keep legal costs to a necessary minimum, court appointments could be
mandatory in those cases in which an indigent family's home is at stake,
and discretionary in all other cases. Courts can be authorized to exercise
that discretion in accordance with factors such as those proposed in the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act.69 Only by providing for the appoint-
ment of counsel in both state and federal forfeiture proceedings can the
public begin to have confidence that property which is ultimately for-
feited to the government actually belongs in a forfeiture asset fund and
that meritorious defenses possessed by ordinary citizens are not simply
abandoned or drummed out because of superior governmental resources.
II. DETAILED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING OF FORFEITED ASSETS
The public also has a compelling interest in knowing the precise na-
ture and value of privately owned assets forfeited each year to law en-
forcement authorities. While federal law requires the Attorney General
to make an annual report to Congress outlining the value of property
taken into the Fund,70 and the ending balance of the Fund and payments
made to state and local law enforcement agencies, the public is not af-
forded a meaningful understanding of the extent to which private prop-
erty is forfeited each year. Congressional testimony from law enforce-
ment authorities reveals that amounts flowing into the federal Fund are
very significant.7 Payments made to state and local authorities by federal
69. The Reform Act would require a court to take into account: the nature and value of the
property subject to foreclosure, including the hardship to the claimant from the loss of the prop-
erty seized, compared to the expense of appointing counsel; the claimant's standing to contest
the forfeiture; and whether the claim appears to be made in good faith or to be frivolous. See
H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. § 2(d) (1997).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) creates the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund to serve
as the repository of all forfeited property seized by the Department of Justice.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6) requires the Attorney General to make this annual report.
72. On July 22, 1996, Stefan D. Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laun-
dering Section of the Department of Justice, testified before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary that the Fund received $325 million (projected) in FY 1996, $487.5 million in FY 1995,
$549.9 million in 1994, $555.7 million in FY 1993, and $531 million in FY 1992. See Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 42, 216-217 (1996). On June 11, 1997, Mr. Cassella reported to the House Committee on
the Judiciary that final figures for FY 1996 amounted to $338.1 million and that first quarter
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authorities through equitable sharing are also sizable.73 While total forfei-
ture figures are reported to Congress pursuant to federal statute, the
public has no detailed information on the sources of forfeited property
and most importantly on what impact the seizure and forfeiture of pri-
vate property is having on local communities.
Similarly, there are only minimal reporting requirements for assets
forfeited under state forfeiture laws. For example, under Pennsylvania
law, every county is required to provide an annual audit to the state at-
torney general of all forfeited property and proceeds.74 However, this
audit is not to be made public.75 The state attorney general is then re-
quired to submit an annual report to the appropriations and judiciary
committees of both houses of the legislature on the proceeds derived
from the sale of forfeited property and the use made of unsold forfeited
property.76 But once again, the public is not given a detailed report of the
sources of these funds, nor, more importantly, a demographic summary
of citizens7 adversely affected by forfeitures or an assessment of the im-
pact of forfeited real property on local communities.78
Detailed, public auditing on all levels will focus increased national at-
tention on the vast amounts of private property forfeited each year to law
enforcement agencies. While law enforcement activities are an obvious
figures for FY 1997 were $110 million. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 116 (1997).
73. Cassella's testimony reports that payments made to state and local agencies amounted
to $175 million (projected) in FY 1996, $228.7 million in FY 1995, and $228.9 million in FY
1994, $224.5 million in FY 1993, and $246.6 million in FY 1992. See Hearing on H.R. 1916, supra
note 71. On June 11, 1997, Mr. Cassella reported to the House Committee on the Judiciary that
final figures for FY 1996 amounted to $163.4 million and that first quarter figures for FY 1997
were 35.1 million. See Hearing on H.R. 1835, supra note 71.
74. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6801(i) (West 1997).
75. See id.
76. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. AiN. § 68010) (West 1997). The attorney general is required to
adopt procedures and guidelines governing the release of information by local counties to pro-
tect the confidentiality of forfeited property or proceeds used in ongoing drug enforcement by
authorities.
77. Questions have been raised as to whether the civil forfeiture program uses racially
based profiling and disproportionately seizes property from racial minorities. See, e.g., Solomon,
supra note 24, at 1185; Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 290-291 (1996).
78. In cases that involve the seizure of a low-income family's house, it appears that the
building may then be boarded up for long periods of time, thereby further contributing to urban
blight and high vacancy rates in low-income neighborhoods. It may also become the subject of
break-ins, vandalism, and even illegal drug activity by individuals unconnected to the house.
Local prosecutors concede that asset forfeitures convey to them a small empire of modest prop-
erties which prove very difficult to dispose of. See Craig R. McCoy, Seized Houses Tough to
Unload, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 17, 1992, at B1. The public should know what properties are
within the inventory of law enforcement authorities and what steps are being taken in a timely
manner to return those properties to productive use. See, e.g., Barbara Barret, Drug Task
Force's Records Covered by Veil of Secrecy, YORK DAILY REcoRD, Dec. 27, 1997, at Al, 1997
WL 14353291 (reporting on the need for public auditing of state forfeiture funds).
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priority for the use of forfeited assets, they should no longer be the only
priority.79 The current mandate to give virtually all forfeited assets to law
enforcement agencies evidences an ill-conceived, legislative choice that
emphasizes apprehension and punishment of drug activity to the virtual
exclusion of prevention of drug use. The time has come to acknowledge
that reducing the demand for drugs, especially among young Americans,
is as important to the war against drugs as prosecuting offenders who
violate state and federal drug laws.' °
III. REDIRECTION OF FORFEITED ASSET FUNDS
Current legislative reform efforts in Congress focus primarily on pro-
cedural changes needed to improve the fairness of the forfeiture process.
They do not, however, propose to reallocate forfeiture funds." As proce-
dural reform remains on the horizon," hundreds of millions of forfeiture
dollars continue to flow almost exclusively to law enforcement agencies.
In contrast to the federal model, a handful of states have allocated
some or all of their state forfeiture funds to purposes other than law en-
forcement. California, for example, directs that fifteen percent of forfei-
ture funds go to combat drug abuse and to divert gang activity while
twenty-four percent of the funds are deposited in the state's general
fund." Indiana places control of forfeited goods in the hands of the state
board of pharmacy and directs that net funds from their sale go to the
79. In fact, some commentators argue quite persuasively that no funds should go to law en-
forcement agencies and that all funds should go into the general treasury, thereby eliminating
any conflict of interest created by law enforcement's pecuniary interest in civil forfeitures. See,
e.g., Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 32. However, the chances of such drastic change in the
allocation of forfeiture funds are, at best, extremely remote. Even the more modest concept,
suggested by this article, of sharing forfeiture funds was previously proposed in The Asset For-
feiture Justice Act introduced by Representative Conyers in 1993 but it, too, failed to win suffi-
cient legislative support at that time. See H.R. 3347, 103d Cong., § 15 (1993).
80. See Melody M. Heaps & James A. Schwartz, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Setting
New Priorities, 1994 U. CHI. LEG. F. 175 (emphasizing the need to treat the demand for drugs
through aggressive and focused treatment, education and prevention programs).
81. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act proposes important procedural changes
(appointment of counsel, reasonable notice to property owners, increase in the government's
burden of proof, etc.) but does not address a reallocation of forfeiture funds. Under pressure
from the White House and the Department of Justice, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
(H.R. 1835) was reworked and introduced on June 19, 1997 as H.R. 1965. The newly revised bill
attracted only three cosponsors (as opposed to 29 cosponsors on H.R. 1835) and has gathered
considerable opposition from previous supporters, such as the ACLU and the NRA, because it
attempts to expand the reach of forfeiture law. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 32, at 106
n.273; Editorial, A Botched Reform, ORANGE CoUNTY REGISTER, October 27, 1997, at B6.
82. On June 19, 1997 the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (H.R. 1965) was referred to the
House Committees on Commerce, Ways and Means and the Judiciary. The referrals to Com-
mittees on Ways and Means and Commerce were extended for a period to end not later than
August 7, 1998.
83. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 11489(a)(2)(A) (West 1997).
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common school funds of the state.8 Under Missouri's state constitution,
forfeiture proceeds go to public schools.f Wisconsin, as well, uses some
of its proceeds for the state school fund. 6 New Jersey directed 10% and
5% of forfeited funds in the first two years, respectively, of the law's ap-
plication to the Hepatitis Inoculation fund.8' Georgia authorizes some
proceeds to go to victim-witness assistance programs and the representa-
tion of indigents in criminal cases."
Pennsylvania is typical of many states, 89 however, in that it directs that
forfeited property or proceeds be utilized almost exclusively for law en-
forcement purposes. 9° In 1994, Pennsylvania amended its Controlled Sub-
stance Forfeiture Act to provide that "in appropriate cases, the district
attorney and the attorney general may designate proceeds from forfeited
property to be utilized by community-based drug and crime fighting pro-
grams and for relocation and protection of witnesses in criminal cases."91
However, legislative history reveals that the only apparent purpose of
this amendment was to clarify conflicting law enforcement interpreta-
tions of whether district attorneys were authorized to convey drug forfei-
ture funds to local D.A.R.E. projects.9 Occasional news accounts reveal
that only token grants are given to drug prevention groups by law en-
forcement authorities. These small amounts are more likely intended to
curry political favor than to make a meaningful impact on drug preven-
tion.93
The nation may be in danger of losing the war on drugs.94 The key to
winning at least some decisive battles in the near future may hinge upon
the development of innovative and aggressive strategies that seek to sta-
bilize the high-poverty communities most victimized by drug activity and
that offer intensive treatment, education and prevention services.95 In
short, the demand for drugs must be curtailed.
84. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-42-20-5 (e) (1) (West 1997).
85. MO. CONST, art IX, § 7. See, also, MO. ANN. STAT § 513.623 (West 1998).
86. See WIsc. STAT § 961.55 (1997).
87. See NJ STAT ANN. § 2C:64-6(a) (West 1995).
88. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49 (1997).
89. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 32, at 52 n.66.
90. Forfeiture funds are to be used for the purposes of enforcing the provisions of the state
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6801(f)
(West 1997).
91. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6801(h) (West 1997).
92. See Remarks of Rep. M. N. Wright on S.B. 313, Legislative Journal-House, Vol III,
Nov. 21, 1994, at 1940.
93. For example, a mini-grant of $1000 from seized assets was awarded to a high school
anti-drug organization. See Whitney D. Greer, Confiscated Drug House Offered for Sale to
Public, INTELLIGENCER JOURNAL, Lancaster, Pa., June 20, 1995, at backpage.
94. See, e.g., John Kaye, President's Message, 31 Mar.-Apr. PROSECUTOR 5 (1997).
95. See Heaps & Schwartz, supra note 80.
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Drug forfeiture proceeds on all levels can help fund this needed ap-
proach. Federal and state forfeiture allocation laws96 should be modified
to provide that no less than fifty percent of all forfeited funds, net of
moneys expended in providing court-appointed counsel to indigent prop-
erty owners, should be made available to establish special services dis-
tricts in high-poverty communities that are most adversely affected by
drug activity. Special services districts have proven to be successful mod-
els for delivering intensive services to defined neighborhoods where tra-
ditional governmental services have enjoyed only minimal success.9' Usu-
ally, special districts are established in downtown business areas or in
neighborhoods that are home to large, private institutions able to afford
the additional revenues needed to fund special districts.98 For this reason,
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty have great difficulty establishing
and supporting effective special services districts. 9
However, forfeiture asset funds could hold the financial key to estab-
lishing joint public-private infrastructures that would allow the high-
poverty neighborhoods most victimized by drug activity to become spe-
cial services districts. Once established, these districts could identify the
intensive services they believe to be most needed within their communi-
ties and then purchase those services from those non-profit organizations
that have demonstrated real success in serving low-income communities.
Priority uses of forfeiture asset funds, for example, might include general
anti-poverty initiatives such as housing and community development, job
96. State legislative reform will not be effective so long as federal adoption of state forfei-
tures permit law enforcement authorities to bypass states allocation requirements by
"federalizing" local forfeitures. Legislative reform must occur at all levels. See Blumenson &
Nilsen, supra note 32, at 111.
97. Special service districts are organized to perform specified governmental functions and
are generally governed by a board of directors which possesses administrative independence
from other units of government. Such districts have financial and revenue powers and are gen-
erally separate corporate entities. See David J. Kennedy, Restraining the Power of Business In-
provement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 283,
286 (1996). While special service districts have enjoyed considerable success, they also present
unique challenges to insure that they adhere to democratic principles in decision-making. See id.
at 329.
98. For example, a special services district in Center City (downtown) Philadelphia levies a
tax for its services while a special services district in University City, Philadelphia is paid for by
voluntary payments from such large institutions as the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel Uni-
versity, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, AMTRAK, and the University City Science Cen-
ter. See Editorial, Positive Steps: The New University City District is Helping to Restore the
Neighborhood Feel of Philadelphia, PHILA. INQUIRER, November 15, 1997, at A18.
99. The Center City special services district has enjoyed considerable success in meeting its
overall objectives. In reflecting upon that success, State Representative Dwight Evans of Phila-
delphia stated in a town meeting, "The question I hear over and over again is: Why can't we
take that same knowledge (referring to the Center City district's success in producing a safer
downtown area) and translate it to locations all over the city?" See Howard Goodman, Solu-
tions to Philadelphia Crime Top Town Meeting Agenda Center City's Success is Envied, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 1997, at B1.
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creation, and free civil legal services to the poor, as well as specific anti-
drug initiatives such as drug treatment, education and prevention serv-
ices. These efforts would be aimed at stabilizing families, insuring ade-
quate housing and educational opportunities, and offering young people
productive alternatives to the attractions of the street. This infusion of
much-needed capital, managed at the local level by responsive special
services districts, would help to reduce the demand for drug use by
strengthening neighborhoods and empowering beleaguered communities
to take real control over their own destinies. If law enforcement agencies
really want the civil forfeiture program to help them win the war on
drugs, they must be willing to share the tools needed to get the job done.

